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Abstract
This paper studies equilibrium selection in supermodular games based on
perfect foresight dynamics. A normal form game is played repeatedly in a
large society of rational agents. There are frictions: opportunities to revise
actions follow independent Poisson processes. Each agent forms his belief
about the future evolution of the action distribution in the society to take
an action that maximizes his expected discounted payoff. A perfect foresight
path is defined to be a feasible path of action distribution along which every
agent with a revision opportunity takes a best response to this path itself.
A Nash equilibrium is said to be absorbing if there exists no perfect foresight
path escaping from a neighborhood of this equilibrium; a Nash equilibrium
is said to be globally accessible if for each initial distribution, there exists
a perfect foresight path converging to this equilibrium. By exploiting the
monotone structure of the dynamics, a unique Nash equilibrium that is ab-
sorbing and globally accessible for any small degree offfiction is identified for
certain classes of supermodular games. For games with monotone potentials,
the selection of the monotone potential maximizer is obtained. Complete
characterizations of absorbing equilibrium and globally accessible equilib-
rium are given for binary supermodular games. An example demonstrates
that unanimity games may have multiple globally accessible equilibria for a
small ffiction.
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